Think about this for a moment... Could this be "free speech" and afforded all the liberties associated with free speech?
Now consider this activity (image from https://thepoliticalinsider.com/trump-flag-burning-liberals-hypocrites/):
As per the Constitution burning a flag is a "protected" activity: Texas v. Johnson (No. 88-155) argued before the Supreme Court March 21, 1989, and decided in favor of this Constitutionally protected activity June 21, 1989. In particular, burning a US flag is considered free speech and therefore is afforded all the protections the Constitution provide any other form of "free speech." (More details below.)
So if burning a flag is "free speech" why wouldn't this be?
Is this then not also free speech?
Clearly each of the two non-flag cases above are protected "political speech."
However, these later forms of speech are currently highly "regulated" by both the FDA and various state and local laws.
Consider that in Bernstein v. Dept. of Justice the restrictions against publishing computer source code for encryption algorithms (considered a"munition" at the time) was also struck down in a similar fashion.
Similarly, publishing DIY 3D printing instructions to make guns was also found an unfair restriction on free speech (the US Justice department settled in favor of the gun publisher).
Why can't I boil propylene glycol and natural flavorings and exhale the extract while extolling my political beliefs?
Can the FDA really regulate "free speech?"
Johnson says that even the US Congress cannot make laws limiting free speech.
Restraining "vape speech" thereforeseems is wrong, especially considering that Texas v. Johnson (No. 88-155) Held: Johnson's conviction for flag desecration smoking vaping is inconsistent with the First Amendment. Pp. 402-420 (adornments my own):
(a) Under the circumstances, Johnson'sburning of the flag smoking vaping constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke the First Amendment. The State conceded that the conduct was expressive. Occurring as it did at the end of a demonstration coinciding with the Republican National Convention, the expressive, overtly political nature of the conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent. Pp. 402-406.
(b) Texas has not asserted an interest in support of Johnson's conviction that is unrelated to the suppression of expression and would therefore permit application of the test set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, whereby an important governmental interest in regulating nonspeech can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms when speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of conduct. An interest in preventing breaches of the peace is not implicated on this record. Expression may not be prohibited [p398] on the basis that an audience that takes serious offense to the expression may disturb the peace, since the Government cannot assume that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot, but must look to the actual circumstances surrounding the expression. Johnson's expression of dissatisfaction with the Federal Government's policies also does not fall within the class of "fighting words" likely to be seen as a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs. This Court's holding does not forbid a State to prevent "imminent lawless action" and, in fact, Texas has a law specifically prohibiting breaches of the peace. Texas' interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity is related to expression in this case and, thus, falls outside the O'Brien test. Pp. 406-410.
(c) The latter interest does not justify Johnson's conviction. The restriction on Johnson's political expression is content based, since the Texas statute is not aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but is designed to protect it from intentional and knowing abuse that causes serious offense to others. It is therefore subject to "the most exacting scrutiny." Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312. The Government may not prohibit the verbal or nonverbal expression of an idea merely because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable, even where our flag is involved. Nor may a State foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it, since the Government may not permit designated symbols to be used to communicate a limited set of messages. Moreover, this Court will not create an exception to these principles protected by the First Amendment for the American flag alone. Pp. 410-422.
755 S.W.2d 92, affirmed.
Now consider this activity (image from https://thepoliticalinsider.com/trump-flag-burning-liberals-hypocrites/):
As per the Constitution burning a flag is a "protected" activity: Texas v. Johnson (No. 88-155) argued before the Supreme Court March 21, 1989, and decided in favor of this Constitutionally protected activity June 21, 1989. In particular, burning a US flag is considered free speech and therefore is afforded all the protections the Constitution provide any other form of "free speech." (More details below.)
So if burning a flag is "free speech" why wouldn't this be?
Is this then not also free speech?
Clearly each of the two non-flag cases above are protected "political speech."
However, these later forms of speech are currently highly "regulated" by both the FDA and various state and local laws.
Consider that in Bernstein v. Dept. of Justice the restrictions against publishing computer source code for encryption algorithms (considered a"munition" at the time) was also struck down in a similar fashion.
Similarly, publishing DIY 3D printing instructions to make guns was also found an unfair restriction on free speech (the US Justice department settled in favor of the gun publisher).
Why can't I boil propylene glycol and natural flavorings and exhale the extract while extolling my political beliefs?
Can the FDA really regulate "free speech?"
Johnson says that even the US Congress cannot make laws limiting free speech.
Restraining "vape speech" therefore
(a) Under the circumstances, Johnson's
(b) Texas has not asserted an interest in support of Johnson's conviction that is unrelated to the suppression of expression and would therefore permit application of the test set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, whereby an important governmental interest in regulating nonspeech can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms when speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of conduct. An interest in preventing breaches of the peace is not implicated on this record. Expression may not be prohibited [p398] on the basis that an audience that takes serious offense to the expression may disturb the peace, since the Government cannot assume that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot, but must look to the actual circumstances surrounding the expression. Johnson's expression of dissatisfaction with the Federal Government's policies also does not fall within the class of "fighting words" likely to be seen as a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs. This Court's holding does not forbid a State to prevent "imminent lawless action" and, in fact, Texas has a law specifically prohibiting breaches of the peace. Texas' interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity is related to expression in this case and, thus, falls outside the O'Brien test. Pp. 406-410.
(c) The latter interest does not justify Johnson's conviction. The restriction on Johnson's political expression is content based, since the Texas statute is not aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but is designed to protect it from intentional and knowing abuse that causes serious offense to others. It is therefore subject to "the most exacting scrutiny." Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312. The Government may not prohibit the verbal or nonverbal expression of an idea merely because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable, even where our flag is involved. Nor may a State foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it, since the Government may not permit designated symbols to be used to communicate a limited set of messages. Moreover, this Court will not create an exception to these principles protected by the First Amendment for the American flag alone. Pp. 410-422.
755 S.W.2d 92, affirmed.
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